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"Answering The Arguments For Abortion Rights," Part One: The
Appeal to Pity, (an article from the Christian Research Journal,
Fall 1990, page 20) by Francis J. Beckwith.
   The Editor-in-Chief of the Christian Research Journal is
Elliot Miller.

 -------------

*Abortion has become the most divisive political and social issue
in late twentieth century America.*

    When the Supreme Court ruled that the state of Missouri was
within its constitutional rights to enact abortion restrictions
(_Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,_ 1989), it moved the
debate from the realm of the federal judiciary into the lap of
the legislative process. It is now possible for other states to
enact similar and even more restrictive legislation. This, of
course, makes a candidate's stance on abortion rights much more
important in the electoral process, since his or her view on
abortion can now make a practical difference in terms of what
laws will be enacted if he or she is elected. And, since our
judiciary has become more conservative, it is apparent that the
abortion rights movement has the most to lose if the issue
returns to the courts. Thus the arguments for abortion rights are
being put forth in the political arena with greater vigor and
hotter rhetoric than ever before.

    It is also apparent that pro-life spokespersons and political
candidates have, for the most part, responded inadequately. They
have either toned down their pro-life position, caved in to the
opposition, or permitted the pro-choice movement to control the
terminology and framework of the debate.[1]

    It is my hope that this four-part series will help to reverse
this trend by providing a rigorous intellectual defense of the
pro-life position -- helpful to policy makers, political
consultants, pro-life leadership, and ordinary Americans.

    In this first article, after briefly explaining what it means
to be pro-life and discussing why abortion on demand is legal in
America, I will present and critique those arguments best
classified as appeals to pity. The second article will deal with
more appeals to pity, appeals to tolerance, and arguments from
_ad hominem_ ("attacking the person"). In articles three and four
I will present the pro-life case for the full humanness of the
unborn from the moment of conception. Article four will conclude
with answers to some common questions about the pro-life
position.

    Of course, not every defender of abortion rights holds to all
or any of the arguments that will appear in this four-part
series. Some of the more sophisticated defenders of abortion
rights eschew much of the popular rhetoric and defend their
position on other grounds. But since most people will come into
contact with these arguments in both the popular media and
pro-choice literature, it is necessary that they be carefully
analyzed.


*_WHAT IS PRO-LIFE?_*

     The pro-life position is subject to somewhat varying
formulations. The most widely accepted and representative of
these can be defined in the following way: The unborn entity is
fully human from the moment of conception. Abortion (narrowly
defined) results in the intentional death of the unborn entity.
Therefore, abortion entails the intentional killing of a human
being. This killing is in most cases unjustified, since the
unborn human being has a full right to life. If, however, there
is a high probability that a woman's pregnancy will result in her
death (as in the case of a tubal pregnancy, for example), then
abortion is justified. For it is a greater good that one human
should live (the mother) rather than two die (the mother and her
child). Or, to put it another way, in such cases the intent is
not to kill the unborn (though that is an unfortunate effect) but
to save the life of the mother. With the exception of such cases,
abortion is an act in which an innocent human being is
intentionally killed; therefore, abortion should be made illegal,
as are all other such acts of killing. This is the pro-life
position I will be defending in this series.

    Some people claim to be both pro-life and pro-choice. This is
a ploy taken by politicians, such as Nevada Senator Richard Bryan
and New York Governor Mario Cuomo, who appear absolutely
petrified to take a stand on the abortion issue. They usually
say, "I'm personally against abortion, but I don't object to a
woman who wants to have one if she believes it is the right thing
to do."

    The problem with this statement is that it doesn't tell us
the reason _why_ the politician claims to be personally against
abortion. Since most people who are against abortion are so
because they believe that the unborn are fully human and have all
the rights that go along with such a status, we would expect that
if the politician were personally against abortion it would be
for the same reason. But this would make the politician's
personal opposition and public permission of abortion somewhat
perplexing, since the assumed reason why he would be personally
against abortion is the same reason why he _should_ be against
publicly permitting it, namely, that an entity which is fully
human has a right to life.

    After all, what would we think of the depth of an
individual's convictions if he claimed that he was personally
against the genocide of a particular ethnic group (e.g., the
Jews), but he added that if others thought this race was not
human, they were certainly welcome to participate in the genocide
if they so chose? What I'm getting at is simply that the nature
of some "personal" opinions warrants public actions, even if
these opinions turn out to be wrong, while other opinions (e.g.,
one's personal preference for German chocolate cake) do not.
Thus, it makes little moral sense to claim that one is both
pro-life and pro-choice.


*_WHY ABORTION ON DEMAND IS LEGAL IN AMERICA_*

    It is important that the reader understand the current legal
status of abortion in America. There seems to be a widespread
perception that the Supreme Court decision _Roe v. Wade_ (1973)
only permits abortions up to 24 weeks, and after that time only
to save the life of the mother. This false perception -- fueled
in large part by groups supporting abortion rights -- is
uncritically accepted by the media. The fact is that the current
law does not restrict a woman from getting an abortion for
practically any reason she deems fit during the entire nine
months of pregnancy. In order to understand why this is the case,
a brief history lesson is in order.

    In _Roe,_ Justice Harry Blackmun divided pregnancy into three
trimesters. He ruled that aside from normal procedural guidelines
(e.g., an abortion must be safely performed by a licensed
physician), a state has no right to restrict abortion in the
first six months of pregnancy. Thus a woman could have an
abortion during the first two trimesters for any reason she
deemed fit, whether it be an unplanned pregnancy, gender
selection, convenience, or rape. In the last trimester the state
has a _right,_ although not an _obligation,_ to restrict
abortions to only those cases in which the mother's health is
jeopardized. In sum, _Roe v. Wade_ does not prevent a state from
allowing unrestricted abortion for the entire nine months of
pregnancy if it so chooses.

    Like many other states, the state of Nevada has chosen to
restrict abortion in the last trimester by only permitting
abortions if "there is a substantial risk that the continuance of
the pregnancy would endanger the life of the patient or would
gravely impair the physical or mental health of the patient."[2]
But this restriction is a restriction in name only. For the
Supreme Court so broadly defined "health" in _Roe's_ companion
decision, _Doe v. Bolton_ (1973), that for all intents and
purposes the current law in every state except Missouri and
Pennsylvania (where the restrictions allowed by _Webster_ have
been enacted into law) allows for abortion on demand.

    In _Bolton_ the court ruled that "health" must be taken in
its broadest possible medical context, and must be defined "in
light of all factors -- physical, emotional, psychological,
familial, and the woman's age -- relevant to the well being of
the patient. All these factors relate to health."[3] Since all
pregnancies have consequences for a woman's emotional and family
situation, the court's health provision has the practical effect
of legalizing abortion up until the time of birth -- if a woman
can convince her physician that she needs the abortion to
preserve her "emotional health." This is why the Senate Judiciary
Committee, after much critical evaluation of the current law in
light of the court's opinions, concluded that "no significant
legal barriers of any kind whatsoever exist today in the United
States for a woman to obtain an abortion for any reason during
any stage of her pregnancy."[4] A number of legal scholars have
come to the same conclusion, offering comments and observations
such as the following:

     In actual effect, _Roe v. Wade_ judicially created
     abortion on demand in the United States.[5]

         The concept of "health," as defined by the Supreme
     Court in _Doe v. Bolton,_ includes all medical,
     psychological, social, familial, and economic factors
     which might potentially inspire a decision to procure
     an abortion. As such, "health" abortion is
     indistinguishable from elective abortion. Thus, until a
     more narrow definition of "health" is obtained, it may
     not be possible to limit effectively the number of
     abortions performed.[6]

         After viability the mother's life or _health_
     (which presumably is to be defined very broadly indeed,
     so as to include what many might regard as the mother's
     convenience...) must, as a matter of constitutional
     law, take precedence over...the fetus's life...[7]
     (emphasis in original).

    It is safe to say, therefore, that in the first six months of
pregnancy a woman can have an abortion for no reason, but in the
last three months she can have it for any reason. This is
abortion on demand.

    Those who defend abortion rights do not deny this disturbing
fact but often dismiss it by claiming that only one percent of
all abortions are done in the last trimester. There are several
problems with this statistical dismissal. First, the fact that
third-trimester abortions are permitted for nearly any reason and
that unborn children are left unprotected is significant in
itself regardless of whether a small percentage of total
abortions has taken place during this time. Second, since there
are about 1.5 million abortions per year in the U.S., it follows
that 15,000 (or one percent) of them are done in the third
trimester. This means that 1,250 of them are performed every
month (about 40 a day). This is no insignificant number.


*_ARGUMENTS THAT APPEAL TO PITY_*

    When one fallaciously argues by appealing to pity, one is
arguing that certain actions should be permitted or tolerated out
of pity for those performing them (or those on whose behalf they
are done), when in fact the basis for showing them pity is not a
legitimate basis for the action. For example, a woman who argues
that she should not receive a parking ticket because her child
was crying and she took her child to a candy store to cheer her
up is fallaciously appealing to pity.[8] The following abortion
rights arguments are textbook examples of such appeals to pity.


*_Argument from the Dangers of Illegal Abortions_*

    Anyone who keeps up with the many pro-choice demonstrations
in the United States cannot help but see on pro-choice placards
and buttons a drawing of the infamous coat hanger. This symbol of
the pro-choice movement represents the many women who were harmed
or killed because they either performed illegal abortions on
themselves (i.e., the surgery was performed with a "coat hanger")
or went to unscrupulous physicians (or "back-alley butchers").
Hence, as the argument goes, if abortion is made illegal, then
women will once again be harmed. Needless to say, this argument
serves a powerful rhetorical purpose. Although the thought of
finding a deceased young woman with a bloody coat hanger dangling
between her legs is -- to say the least -- unpleasant, powerful
and emotionally charged rhetoric does not a good argument make.

    The chief reason this argument fails is because it commits
the fallacy of _begging the question._ In fact, as we shall see,
this fallacy seems to lurk behind a good percentage of the
popular arguments for the pro-choice position. One begs the
question when one assumes what one is trying to prove. Another
way of putting it is to say that the arguer is _reasoning in a
circle._ For example, if one _concludes_ that the Boston Celtics
are the best team because no team is as good, one is not giving
any reasons for this belief other than the conclusion one is
trying to prove, since to claim that a team is the _best team_ is
exactly the same as saying that _no team is as good._

    The question-begging nature of the coat-hanger argument is
not difficult to discern: only by assuming that the unborn are
not fully human does the argument work. If the unborn are not
fully human, then the pro-choice advocate has a legitimate
concern, just as one would have in overturning a law forbidding
appendicitis operations if countless people were needlessly dying
of both appendicitis and illegal operations. But if the unborn
_are_ fully human, this pro-choice argument is tantamount to
saying that because people die or are harmed while killing other
people, the state should make it safe for them to do so.

    Even some pro-choice advocates, who argue for their position
in other ways, admit that the coat hanger/back-alley argument is
fallacious. For example, pro-choice philosopher Mary Anne Warren
clearly recognizes that her position on abortion cannot rest on
this argument without it first being demonstrated that the unborn
entity is not fully human. She writes that "the fact that
restricting access to abortion has tragic side effects does not,
in itself, show that the restrictions are unjustified, since
murder is wrong regardless of the consequences of prohibiting
it..."[9]

    Although it is doubtful whether statistics can establish a
particular moral position, it should be pointed out that there
has been considerable debate over both the actual number of
illegal abortions and the number of women who died as a result of
them prior to legalization.[10] Prior to Roe, pro-choicers were
fond of saying that nearly a _million_ women every year obtained
illegal abortions performed with rusty coat hangers in
back-alleys that resulted in _thousands_ of fatalities. Given the
gravity of the issue at hand, it would go beyond the duty of
kindness to call such claims an exaggeration, because several
well-attested facts establish that the pro-choice movement was
simply lying.

    First, Dr. Bernard Nathanson -- who was one of the original
leaders of the American pro-abortion movement and co-founder of
N.A.R.A.L. (National Abortion Rights Action League), and who has
since become pro-life -- admits that he and others in the
abortion rights movement intentionally fabricated the number of
women who allegedly died as a result of illegal abortions.

     How many deaths were we talking about when abortion was
     illegal? In N.A.R.A.L. we generally emphasized the
     drama of the individual case, not the mass statistics,
     but when we spoke of the latter it was always "5,000 to
     10,000 deaths a year." I confess that I knew the
     figures were totally false, and I suppose the others
     did too if they stopped to think of it. But in the
     "morality" of the revolution, it was a useful figure,
     widely accepted, so why go out of our way to correct it
     with honest statistics. The overriding concern was to
     get the laws eliminated, and anything within reason
     which had to be done was permissible.[11]

    Second, Dr. Nathanson's observation is borne out in the best
official statistical studies available. According to the U.S.
Bureau of Vital Statistics, there were a mere 39 women who died
from illegal abortions in 1972, the year before _Roe v.
Wade._[12] Dr. Andre Hellegers, the late Professor of Obstetrics
and Gynecology at Georgetown University Hospital, pointed out
that there has been a steady decrease of abortion-related deaths
since 1942. That year there were 1,231 deaths. Due to improved
medical care and the use of penicillin, this number fell to 133
by 1968.[13] The year before the first state-legalized abortion,
1966, there were about 120 abortion-related deaths.[14]

    This is not to minimize the undeniable fact that such deaths
were significant losses to the families and loved ones of those
who died. But one must be willing to admit the equally undeniable
fact that if the unborn are fully human, these abortion-related
maternal deaths pale in comparison to the 1.5 million preborn
humans who die (on the average) every year. And even if we grant
that there were more abortion-related deaths than the low number
confirmed, there is no doubt that the 5,000 to 10,000 deaths
cited by the abortion rights movement is a gross
exaggeration.[15]

    Third, it is simply false to claim that there were nearly a
million illegal abortions per year prior to legalization. There
is no reliable statistical support for this claim.[16] In
addition, a highly sophisticated recent study has concluded that
"a reasonable estimate for the actual number of criminal
abortions per year in the prelegalization era [prior to 1967]
would be from a low of 39,000 (1950) to a high of 210,000 (1961)
and a mean of 98,000 per year.[17]

    Fourth, it is misleading to say that _pre-Roe_ illegal
abortions were performed by "back-alley butchers" with rusty coat
hangers. While president of Planned Parenthood, Dr. Mary
Calderone pointed out in a 1960 _American Journal of Health_
article that Dr. Kinsey showed in 1958 that 84% to 87% of all
illegal abortions were performed by licensed physicians in good
standing. Dr. Calderone herself concluded that "90% of all
illegal abortions are presently done by physicians."[18] It seems
that the vast majority of the alleged "back-alley butchers"
eventually became the "reproductive health providers" of our
present day.


*_Argument from Economic Inequity_*

    Pro-choice advocates often argue that prior to abortion being
legalized, pregnant women who did not go to unscrupulous
physicians or "back-alley butchers" traveled to foreign nations
where abortions were legal. This was an option open only to rich
women who could afford such an expense. Hence, _Roe v. Wade_ has
made the current situation fairer for poor women. Therefore, if
abortion is prohibited it will not prevent rich women from having
safe and legal abortions elsewhere.[19]

    This argument is fallacious: it _assumes_ that legal abortion
is a _moral good_ which poor women will be denied if abortion is
made illegal. But since the morality of abortion is the point
under question, the pro-choice proponent assumes what he or she
is trying to prove and therefore begs the question.

    One can think of a number of examples to better understand
this point. To cite one, we would consider it outrageous if
someone argued that the hiring of hit men to kill one's enemies
should be legalized, since -- after all -- the poor do not have
easy economic access to such "professionals."

    In the abortion debate the question of whether abortion
entails the death of a being who is fully human must be answered
_before_ the question of fairness is even asked. That is to say,
since equal opportunity to eliminate an innocent human being is
rarely if ever a moral good, the question of whether it is fair
that certain rich people will have privileged access to abortion
if it becomes illegal must be answered _after_ we answer the
question of whether abortion in fact is _not_ the killing of an
innocent human life. For it is not true that the vices of the
wealthy are virtues simply because the poor are denied them.


*_Argument from Population, Poverty, and Financial Burden_*

    Some pro-choice advocates make much of both the use of
abortion as a means of population control and the financial and
emotional burden a child may put on a family. It is argued that
in such situations abortion is justified. Along the same lines, a
number of pro-choice advocates argue that if abortion is
forbidden, then the poor will keep producing more children to
draw more welfare. Hence, in addition to pity, there is an
economic incentive invoked in this appeal.

    Beyond pointing out that the so-called "population explosion"
is an economic and not a people problem,[20] there are several
fundamental moral problems with this argument. First, it does not
really support the pro-choice position that abortion is a
fundamental right the pregnant woman can exercise for any reason
she deems fit during the entire nine months of pregnancy (_see
above_). If this argument is successful it only establishes the
right to an abortion in the cases of overpopulation, poverty, and
financial burden, and _not_ "for any reason the pregnant woman
deems fit."

    Second, like the other arguments we have examined, this one
also begs the question. That is, only if the pro-choice advocate
assumes that the unborn poor are not fully human does his or her
policy carry any weight. For if the unborn poor are fully human,
the pro-choice advocate's plan to eliminate overpopulation and
poverty by permitting the extermination of the unborn poor is
inconsistent with his or her own ethic of personal rights. Thus,
the question of aborting the unborn poor, like the points brought
up earlier, hinges on the status of the unborn.

    Furthermore, if the unborn are fully human, then this is also
a good argument for infanticide and the killing of all humans we
find to be financially burdensome or emotionally taxing.
Therefore, only by assuming that the unborn are not fully human
does the pro-choice advocate avoid such horrendous implications.
Thus, in order for this argument to work, the pro-choice advocate
must beg the question.

    This is not to say that the human race may not reach a time
in its history at which overpopulation becomes a problem so
severe that it must significantly curtail its birthrate. At such
a time it would be wise to try to persuade people either to
willingly use contraceptive devices or to practice sexual
discipline. If such a tactic does not work, then forced
sterilization may be a viable -- albeit desperate -- option,
since it does not entail the death of the unborn. In any event,
if the unborn are fully human, abortion is not a solution to
population problems even in the most dire of circumstances.
Hence, the real question is whether or not the unborn are fully
human.

    Underlying this type of pro-choice argument is a fundamental
confusion between the concept of "finding a solution" and the
concept of "eliminating a problem." For example, one can
eliminate the problem of poverty by executing all poor people,
but this would not really solve the problem, since it would
directly conflict with a basic moral truth that human beings
should not be gratuitously exterminated for the sake of easing
economic tension. This "solution" would undermine the very moral
sentiments that ground our compassion for poor people -- namely,
that they are humans of great worth and should be treated with
dignity regardless of their predicament. Similarly, one can
eliminate the problem of having a headache by cutting off one's
head, but this is certainly not a real solution. Therefore, the
argument of the pro-choice advocate is superfluous unless he or
she can first show that the unborn are not fully human and hence
do not deserve to be the recipients of our basic moral
sentiments. Baylor University philosopher and bioethicist Baruch
Brody comments:

     In an age where we doubt the justice of capital
     punishment even for very dangerous criminals, killing a
     fetus who has not done any harm, to avoid a future
     problem it may pose, seems totally unjust. There are
     indeed many social problems that could be erased simply
     by destroying those persons who constitute or cause
     them, but that is a solution repugnant to the values of
     society itself. In short, then, if the fetus is a human
     being, the appeal to its being unwanted justifies no
     abortions.[21]

    This is not to minimize the fact that there are tragic
circumstances with which our society is all too familiar, such as
the poor woman with four small children who has become _pregnant
by her alcoholic husband._ But once again we must ask whether or
not the unborn entity is fully human, for hardship does not
justify homicide. In such cases, those in the religious and
charitable communities should help lend financial and emotional
support to the family. And it may be wise -- if it is a case of
extreme hardship -- for the woman to put her baby up for
adoption, so that she may give to others the gift of parenthood.


*_Argument from the Deformed and Mongoloid Child_*

    Since it is now possible to detect through amniocentesis and
other tests whether the unborn entity will turn out to be
physically or mentally handicapped,[22] some pro-choice advocates
argue that abortion should remain a choice for women who do not
want to take care of such a child. Another reason cited for
advocating the aborting of the defective unborn is that it is
better for such children never to be born rather than to live a
life burdened with a serious mental or physical handicap. There
are several problems with this argument.

    First, this argument, like many of the appeals to "hard
cases," does not _really_ support the pro-choice position -- the
position that abortion is a fundamental right the pregnant woman
can exercise for any reason she deems fit during the entire nine
months of pregnancy (_see above_). In other words, if this
argument is successful in showing that abortion is justified in
the case of a woman pregnant with a deformed or Mongoloid fetus,
it only establishes the right to an abortion in such cases, _not_
"for any reason the pregnant woman deems fit."

    Second, like many of the pro-choice arguments, this argument
begs the question by assuming that the unborn entity is not fully
human. For if the unborn are fully human, then to promote the
aborting of the handicapped unborn is no different morally than
promoting the execution of handicapped people who are already
born. But such a practice is morally reprehensible. Are not
adults with deformities human? Then so too are smaller people who
have the same deformities. In fact, pro-choice advocates Peter
Singer and Helga Kuhse, who argue for their position in other
ways, admit that "pro-life groups are right about one thing: the
location of the baby inside or outside the womb cannot make such
a crucial moral difference...The solution, however, is not to
accept the pro-life view that the fetus is a human being with the
same moral status as yours or mine. The solution is the very
opposite: to abandon the idea that all human life is of equal
worth."[23] Although I do not agree with this conclusion, and
will argue against it in this series, Singer and Kuhse make an
important observation: the question is not whether a handicapped
individual is born or unborn, but whether handicapped human life
should be protected equally with healthy human life.

    Third, it is amazingly presumptuous for mere human beings to
say that certain other human beings are better off not existing.
Those who make such judgments concerning the handicapped seem to
assume that handicapped persons cannot live meaningful and even
happy lives. However, this assumption is false. Former Surgeon
General C. Everett Koop, who worked for years with severely
deformed infants as a pediatric surgeon at Philadelphia's
Children's Hospital, commented that "it has been my constant
experience that disability and unhappiness do not necessarily go
together."[24] He continues:

     Some of the most unhappy children whom I have known
     have all of their physical and mental faculties, and on
     the other hand some of the happiest youngsters have
     borne burdens which I myself would find very difficult
     to bear. Our obligation in such circumstances is to
     find alternatives for the problems our patients face. I
     don't consider death an acceptable alternative. With
     our technology and creativity, we are merely at the
     beginning of what we can do educationally and in the
     field of leisure activities for such youngsters. And
     who knows what happiness is for another person?[25]

    This is not to deny that there are tragedies in life and that
having a handicapped child is often a difficult burden to
undertake. But I think it is important to realize that if the
unborn entity is fully human, homicide cannot be justified simply
because it relieves one of a terrible burden. Though it may be
hard to accept, I believe the following principle is fundamental
to correct moral reasoning: _it is better to suffer evil rather
than to inflict it._[26] If this moral precept were not true, all
so-called moral dilemmas would be easily soluble by simply
appealing to one's own relief from suffering. But in such a world
the antidote would be worse than the poison, for people would
then have a right to inflict suffering on another if it relieved
them of their own. This would be morally intolerable.

    Moreover, it should not be forgotten that a handicapped child
can give both society and the family into which it has been born
an opportunity to exercise true compassion, love, charity, and
kindness. It is an assault upon our common humanity to deny our
capacity to attain virtue in the presence of suffering.

    Fourth, for obvious reasons many handicapped people are
vehemently opposed to this argument. In fact, there is not a
single organization of handicapped people that is on record in
favor of abortion of those who may be handicapped. Surgeon
General Koop cites the following letter, which appeared in the
_London Daily Telegraph_ (8 Dec. 1962) at a time when European
newspapers were seriously discussing the use of abortion as an
effective means by which to avoid the birth of children who
became defective _in utero_ due to their mother's use of
Thalidomide (a tranquilizer used by European women in the 1950s
and 1960s but never approved by the FDA for sale in the U.S.):

                                             Trowbridge
                                             Kent
                                             Dec. 8, 1962


     Sirs:

         We were disabled from causes other than
     Thalidomide, the first of us two having useless arms
     and hands; the second, two useless legs; and the third,
     the use of neither arms nor legs.

         We were fortunate...in having been allowed to live
     and we want to say with strong conviction how thankful
     we are that none took it upon themselves to destroy us
     as useless cripples.

         Here at the Debarue school of spastics, one of the
     schools of the National Spastic Society, we have found
     worthwhile and happy lives and we face our future with
     confidence. Despite our disability, life still has much
     to offer and we are more than anxious, if only
     metaphorically, to reach out toward the future.

         This, we hope will give comfort and hope to the
     parents of the Thalidomide babies, and at the same time
     serve to condemn those who would contemplate the
     destruction of even a limbless baby.

                              Yours faithfully,
                              Elaine Duckett,
                              Glynn Verdon,
                              Caryl Hodges.[27]

     Fifth, if there were a negative correlation between
happiness and handicap, it would seem natural to find more
suicides among the handicapped than the general public. But the
opposite is the case. Professor Krason points out that "no
study...has found that handicapped persons are more likely than
non-handicapped persons to want to be killed or to commit
suicide." Citing a study of the late Dr. Hellegers, Krason writes
that "of 200 consecutive suicides at the Baltimore Morgue...none
had been committed by people with congenital anomalies."[28]

    A society whose ethic asserts that certain preborn human
beings forfeit their right to life simply because they have a
certain physical deformity or mental handicap is a society that
will inevitably see those who have already been born with the
same features as having lives "not worth living."

    The chilling logic of this conclusion was played out in a
real-life situation in 1982. That year, Infant Doe, an Indiana
newborn who was born with Down's syndrome and correctable spina
bifida, was permitted to die at the request of her parents who
asked the attending physician to withhold food and water from the
infant. This parental decision was upheld by an Indiana court.
Since her spina bifida was correctable by surgery, if Infant Doe
had not been "retarded," there is no doubt that the parents would
have requested the necessary surgery. So it was not the spina
bifida that killed Infant Doe, but parents who neglected her
simply because she had Down's syndrome. While commenting on this
case, columnist George Will writes about his own son, Jonathan, a
Down's syndrome citizen:

     When a commentator has a direct personal interest in an
     issue, it behooves him to say so. Some of my best
     friends are Down's syndrome citizens. (Citizens are
     what Down's syndrome children are if they avoid being
     homicide victims in hospitals.)

         Jonathan Will, 10, fourth-grader and Orioles fan
     (and the best Wiffle-ball hitter in southern Maryland),
     has Down's syndrome. He does not "suffer from" (as
     newspapers are wont to say) Down's syndrome. He suffers
     from nothing, except anxiety about the Orioles' lousy
     start. He is doing nicely, thank you. But he is bound
     to have quite enough problems dealing with society --
     receiving rights, let alone empathy. He can do without
     people like Infant Doe's parents, and courts like
     Indiana's asserting by their actions the principle that
     people like him are less than fully human. On the
     evidence, Down's syndrome citizens have little to learn
     about being human from people responsible for the death
     of Infant Doe.[29]

    Finally, abortion is sometimes justified by pro-choicers by
appealing to certain extreme cases in which the entities in the
womb are so genetically abnormal as to be arguably nonhuman.

    For example, the tertatoma is simply a tumor with some human
genetic material that has gone awry. Sometimes it may contain
hair, teeth, skin, or even fingers, but it is not an unborn human
entity and does not have the inherent capacity to develop under
any conditions into a human infant. The tertatoma is part of the
woman's bodily tissue and is not a separate human individual.[30]

    More difficult is the case of the anencephalic baby.
According to the _American Medical Association Encyclopedia of
Medicine,_ anencephaly is the "absence at birth of the brain,
cranial vault (top of the skull), and spinal cord. Most affected
infants are stillborn or survive only a few hours." Anencephaly
occurs "due to a failure in development of the neural tube, the
nerve tissue in the embryo that eventually develops into the
spinal cord and brain." A woman can know early in pregnancy that
she is carrying an anencephalic baby "by measurement of
_alphafetoprotein,_ by _ultrasound scanning,_ and by
_amnio-centesis_..."[31]

    We may or may not be dealing with human beings in the case of
anencephalic babies. Citing the work of Professor Germain Grisez,
Krason argues that "there are two ways we may view the
'anencephalic monster,' depending on when the abnormality
originates." One way, "when the abnormality or the genetic
certainty of it is present from conception, is to view the
organism as human in its conception, but incapable of developing
beyond a few hours, a few days, or a few weeks." He argues "that
in such cases, especially if the specifically human genetic
pattern is greatly transformed, we may not consider the conceptus
a human individual."[32]

    Relying on Grisez, Krason writes that when the abnormality
develops some time after conception we could view the
anencephelic as we would an individual who has had his head blown
off by a shotgun. "Such a person is human and remains such until
he dies." Since "the anencephalic originated as a human and
developed normally up to the point when the neural tube failed to
close...he thus can be viewed as a human being, albeit a damaged
one, whose abnormality will cause his death shortly after birth,
like the gunshot-wounded person will die a short while after his
wound."[33] A damaged human is not a _non_human.

    It should be remembered, however, that the anencephalic is a
"hard case," and cannot be used to justify the vast majority of
abortions that involve the killing of _healthy_ unborns for any
reason the pregnant woman deems fit. Furthermore, the argument
from the apparent nonhumanness of the anencephalic implicitly
admits what is the main contention of the pro-life position,
namely, that unborn human beings should not be killed.

 ---------------------------------------------------------------
*Francis J. Beckwith, Ph.D.,* is a Lecturer of Philosophy at the
University of Nevada, Las Vegas. He has written extensively on
ethics, abortion, and public policy, including _A Matter of Life
and Death: Questions and Answers about Abortion and Euthanasia,_
a forthcoming book co-authored with Norman L. Geisler.
 ---------------------------------------------------------------

*NOTES*

 1 See Fred Barnes, "Republicans Miscarry Abortion," _The
   American Spectator_ 23 (January 1990):14-15.
 2 _Nevada Revised Statute,_ 442.250, subsection 3.
 3 _Doe v. Bolton_ 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973).
 4 Report, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, on Senate
   Resolution 3, 98th Congress, 98-149, 7 June 1983, 6.
 5 John Warwick Montgomery, "The Rights of Unborn Children,"
   _Simon Greenleaf Law Review_ 5 (1985-86):40.
 6 Victor G. Rosenblum and Thomas J. Marzen, "Strategies for
   Reversing _Roe v. Wade_ through the Courts," in _Abortion and
   the Constitution: Reversing Roe v. Wade through the Courts,_
   ed. Dennis Horan, Edward R. Grant, and Paige C. Cunningham
   (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1987),
   199-200.
 7 John Hart Ely, "The Wages of Crying Wolf: A comment on _Roe v.
   Wade," Yale Law Journal_ 82 (1973):921.
 8 John Nolt and Dennis Rohatyn, _Schaum's Outline of Theory and
   Problems of Logic_ (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1988),
   172.
   in _The Problem of Abortion,_ 2nd ed., ed. Joel Feinberg
   (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1984), 103.
10 _See_ Daniel Callahan, _Abortion: Law, Choice, and Morality_
   (New York: Macmillan, 1970), 132-36; and Stephen Krason,
   _Abortion: Politics, Morality, and the Constitution_ (Lanham,
   MD: University Press of America, 1984), 301-10.
11 Bernard Nathanson, M.D., _Aborting America_ (New York:
   Doubleday, 1979), 193.
12 From the U.S. Bureau of Vital Statistics Center for Disease
   Control, as cited in Dr. and Mrs. J. C. Wilke, _Abortion:
   Questions and Answers,_ rev. ed. (Cincinnati: Hayes
   Publishing, 1988), 101-2.
13 From Dr. Hellegers's testimony before the U.S. Senate
   Judiciary Committee on Constitutional Amendments, April 25, 1
   1974; cited in John Jefferson Davis, _Abortion and the
   Christian_ (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed,
   1984), 75.
14 From the U.S. Bureau of Vital Statistics Center for Disease
   Control, as cited in Wilke, 101-2.
15 _See_ Davis, 75.
16 _See_ note 10; Callahan, 132-36; Krason, 301-10.
17 Barbara J. Syska, Thomas W. Hilgers, M.D., and Dennis O'Hare,
   "An Objective Model for Estimating Criminal Abortions and Its
   Implications for Public Policy," in _New Perspectives on Human
   Abortion,_ ed. Thomas Hilgers, M.D., Dennis J. Horan, and
   David Mall (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America,
   1981), 78.
18 Mary Calderone, "Illegal Abortion as a Public Health Problem,"
   in _American Journal of Health_ 50 (July 1960):949.
19 _See_ Craig Walton, "Socrates Comes to His Senses During
   Meeting With Bush," _Las Vegas Review-Journal_ (3 November
   1988):11B.
20 _See_ Jaqueline Kasun, "The Population Bomb Threat: A Look at
   the Facts," in _The Zero People,_ 33-41. Originally published
   in _Intellect_ (June 1977).
21 Baruch Brody, _Abortion and the Sanctity of Human Life: A
   Philosophical View_ (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1975),
   36-37.
22 _See_ "Birth Defects," in _The American Medical Association
   Encyclopedia of Medicine,_ 172-73.
23 Peter Singer and Helen Kuhse, "On Letting Handicapped Infants
   Die," in _The Right Thing to Do: Basic Readings in Moral
   Philosophy,_ ed. James Rachels (New York: Random House, 1989),
   146.
24 Quoted in Nathanson, 235.
25 _Ibid.,_ 235-36.
26 _See_ Peter Kreeft, _The Unaborted Socrates_ (Downers Grove,
   IL: InterVarsity, 1982), 140.
27 C. Everett Koop, _The Right to Live: The Right to Die_
   (Wheaton, IL: Tyndale House, 1976), 51-52.
28 Krason, 295.
29 George Will, "The Killing Will Not Stop," in _The Zero
   People,_ 206-7. Originally published in the _Washington Post_
   (22 April 1982).
30 _AMA Encyclopedia,_ 971.
31 _Ibid.,_ 104.
32 Krason, 386-87. _See_ Germain Grisez, _Abortion: the Myths,
   the Realities, and the Arguments_ (New York: Corpus Books,
   1970), 30.
33 Krason, 387. _See_ Grisez, 28-30.


 -------------

End of document, CRJ0038A.TXT (original CRI file name),
"Abortion Arguments: Appeal to Pity"
release A, August 24, 1994
R. Poll, CRI

First of a series, this article was later revised, expanded and incorporated into the book
_Politically Correct Death: Answering The Arguments For Abortion Rights_ (Baker Book House,
1993).

(A special note of thanks to Bob and Pat Hunter for their help in
the preparation of this ASCII file for BBS circulation.)

-----------------------------------------------------------------

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